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Abstract  
Development plans across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) emphasise logistical 
infrastructure as a driver of economic diversification. Investments in maritime ports, 
roads, rail, airports, and logistics cities are transforming the economic geography of 
the region. This study aims to make visible this neglected aspect of the physical 
transformation of the GCC with a focus on the understudied maritime container ports 
in Oman and Qatar. Shifting the analysis to emergent maritime logistical infrastructure 
at a regional level gives insight into the uneven developments within the GCC’s 
integration project. Three key features emerge: (a) a large degree of duplication in 
maritime port infrastructure across GCC states; (b) a regional hierarchy among GCC 
states that are resource rich and those dependent on public-private partnerships; and 
(c) increasing competition among internationally dominant port operators looking to 
gain access to the GCC maritime port market. These features both reflect and reinforce 
competitive tensions within the regional integration project. 
Keywords: Gulf Cooperation Council, logistics, infrastructure, ports, Oman, Qatar 
Introduction 
The suspension of diplomatic ties and effective blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt which came into effect in June 2017, 
brought to the fore the unevenness within the Gulf Cooperation Council’s logistical 
infrastructure.1 Most strikingly, the maritime and air blockade disrupted trade routes 
into Qatar with many commentators raising the spectre of possible food and other 
commodity shortages.  These prospective shortages were a direct result of Qatar’s 
underdeveloped maritime routes and its reliance on Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port for basic 
imports. In a move that went virtually unnoticed in the international press coverage of 
this crisis, one of Qatar’s responses to the blockade was the use of Omani ports as an 
alternative to Jebel Ali’s conventional role as a gateway to the region. Within days of 
the crisis, Maersk Line announced its Qatar coverage plan, utilising a feeder line from 
Salalah Port; Qatar Ports Management simultaneously launched two direct shipping 
                                                             
1 The GCC is a regional bloc composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is increasingly positioned as a central 
node in international circulation networks. 
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services linking New Hamad Port with Oman’s Sohar and Salalah (Reuters, 2017). The 
basic logistical problems facing Qatar in the wake of the suspension of ties with its 
powerful neighbours points to the uneven patterns, tempo and future direction of 
logistics in the Gulf. While the GCC is often analysed from the prism of the carbohydras 
trade, a focus on logistical infrastructure is revealing of the regional tensions and 
hierarchies.  
 
Over recent years there has been an increasing scholarly interest in analysing the 
‘science of business logistics,’ namely the significant shifts in the conception and 
management of commodity circulation in the global economy through complex supply 
chains across networked transport infrastructure, logistics hubs and trade corridors 
(Bonacich and Wilson, 2008; Cowen, 2014; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2015; Sekula and 
Burch, 2011). While Cowen rightly dates ‘the most significant conceptual and 
calculative shifts underpinning the logistics revolution’ to the 1960s and investment in 
intermodal infrastructures to the 1970s, it was in 1990s that ‘the capacity for countries 
to participate in the physical circulation of global trade became itself a measure of 
development’ (Cowen, 2014: 58).1 Neoliberal policies, diffused through international 
institutions, helped to foster this trend and have come to dominate development 
planning at the state level.  The rise of these logistics networks is thus closely connected 
to the globally structured character of commodity circulation in contemporary 
capitalism, which ‘can be assured only through the creation of an efficient, spatially 
integrated transport system’ (Harvey, 2006: 377). Harvey notes, however, that the 
concrete form of these infrastructures of circulation needs to be understood in relation 
to existing patterns of capitalist accumulation, as ‘revolutions in productive forces 
within the transport industry always have location specific effects’ (Harvey, 2006: 378).  
 
This article aims to map and analyse such ‘location specific effects’ in the context of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a region largely neglected in the critical literature 
on logistics spaces. Whereas the corporate press is rife with information about 
opportunities in the GCC logistics market, scholarly work analysing this development 
lags behind. Most work on maritime infrastructure in the Gulf has focused on the 
emirate of Dubai, as the location of the Gulf’s largest ports and the Gulf city most 
integrated into global trade networks (Akhavan, 2017; Jacobs and Hall, 2007; Ramos, 
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2010). Although Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port will feature heavily in the following analysis, 
my aim in this paper is to examine the emerging logistical hierarchies in the region and 
situate the development of Gulf maritime ports within the broader context of the GCC 
regional integration project, contributing a regional perspective to the logistics 
literature. There is a need to move beyond the Dubai-centric character of much of the 
logistics literature to more fully incorporate the wider dynamics of the GCC as a whole 
and to take full account of the impact of rapid absorption into internationalised logistics 
chains on specific regions.   
 
While the logistics literature has largely focused on the major logistical nodes in the 
Global North and/or East Asia, broadening the literature to incorporate emergent 
maritime infrastructure across regions, allows us to examine the contradictory and 
uneven developments in logistics space. Authors examining business logistics have 
rightly argued that logistical systems modelling looks to construct an uninterrupted 
space of supposedly seamless trade, forging globally integrated networks. Yet, despite 
its totalising ethos, logistical modelling incorporates states and specific cities into 
global logistics chains differentially. In the case of the GCC it has led to a contradictory 
process of infrastructural duplication and increased competition among both states and 
global port operators to dominate the important trade route. I argue for a more critical 
theorisation of unevenness in the development of logistics across regional spaces, in 
other words an understanding that the logistics revolution remains an unfinished and 
contested process which in particular instances may accentuate regional hierarchies.  
 
In carrying out this analysis I pay particular attention to the construction of container 
ports and industrial zones in Oman and Qatar. For the past ten years, Oman has stood 
at number three regionally in terms of container throughput, and there are plans for 
massive expansion in its maritime and logistical infrastructure. Much more recently, 
Qatar has identified expansion of ports and associated logistical infrastructure as a key 
strategic priority, largely associated with the country’s successful bid for the 2022 
World Cup. Although Qatar’s expansion of maritime infrastructure is still at an early 
stage, it is now the site of the largest transport infrastructure projects in the GCC. The 
recent crisis facing Qatar has highlighted the uneven logistical terrain across the region, 
yet the solutions found through Oman’s ports highlight the different moments of 
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logistics development in the GCC. By looking at these emergent maritime 
infrastructures in their regional context, we can see the ways that hierarchies across the 
GCC are accentuated and reinforced by the development of the logistics sector in places 
other than the dominant ports of the UAE. The current crisis has highlighted the 
significance of Qatar and Oman in particular. On one hand Qatar’s reliance on Jebel 
Ali became all too apparent. Oman on the other hand holds a particular mediating role 
and has positioned its logistical infrastructure to be able to circumvent Jebel Ali’s 
dominance as has happened in this case. The specific entry of international port 
operators through Public Private Partnerships, elaborated below, has given the non-oil 
rich state leverage at the regional level, at the same time allowing international port 
operators to take advantage of regional tensions, quickly moving to absorb any business 
lost by Jebel Ali. The two cases highlight the contested impact of the logistics 
revolution in the region and are particularly revealing of the emerging geo-spatial 
politics of the GCC.  
 
A focus on Qatar and Oman reveals that while the GCC is avowedly about collective 
security and closer economic and political integration, it is also simultaneously a project 
riven by competitive tensions and existing hierarchies between the various Gulf states. 
These two cases in particular, due to their positioning in the regional order, and in light 
of the recent crisis, expose the key features of this contradictory process: (a) a large 
degree of duplication in port infrastructure in the region; (b) divergent modalities of 
logistics development that are particularly marked by differences between those GCC 
states that are resource rich and those dependent on public-private partnerships to 
develop their transport infrastructure; and (c) increasing competition among 
internationally dominant port operators looking to gain access to the GCC maritime 
port market. All of these trends act to accentuate the hierarchical structure of the GCC 
itself, and in turn act back upon the potential future trajectories of logistics 
infrastructure at the national level. 
 
The article begins by outlining some of the recent academic insights into the global 
logistics industry and the position of the GCC within this. I then turn to examining the 
development of four specific container ports in Oman and Qatar (Sohar, Salalah, and 
Duqm in Oman and New Hamad in Qatar). Each of these emerging ports is under either 
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construction or re-development, and, as a result, the expected capacity growth over the 
next five years will considerably shift the economic geography of trade in the GCC. 
The discussion draws upon extensive multi-year fieldwork in the region, including 
attendance at regional logistics industry conferences, tours of major ports, and semi-
structured interviews with managers and legal experts drawing up public-private 
partnerships in the region. After mapping these changes across Oman and Qatar, I turn 
to situating these port developments within the wider GCC frame, arguing that these 
new projects likely herald a major shift in political and economic relations in the Gulf 
over the coming years. 
 
The ‘Logistics Revolution’  
 
The focus on constructing mega transport infrastructure and creating logistics hubs in 
the GCC is in line with what researchers have termed the international revolution in 
logistics (Allen, 1997; Bonacich and Wilson, 2008). As a ‘science of circulation’ 
(Cowen, 2014: 25) business logistics manages commodity circulation across 
internationalised supply chains, attempting to produce supposedly seamless and secure 
trade. Central to the globally-structured character of commodity circulation in 
contemporary capitalism is the logistical cartography of networked infrastructures, 
trade corridors, gateways and logistics hubs. In other words, internationalised patterns 
of production and consumption are mapped onto a ‘landscape of logistics in which more 
land area is given over to accommodate the shipment, staging, and delivery of shipped 
goods’ (Waldheim and Berger, 2008: 220).  
The main features of the logistics revolution took shape during what McNally described 
as a ‘major spatial-geographical reorganization of capitalism’ in the neoliberal period, 
‘with the massive development of global sweatshops, many located in low-wage and 
capital-friendly export processing zones that gave rise to new centres of global 
accumulation, most notably in China’ (McNally, 2011: 44). Related to this shift, a 
substantial body of literature has discussed and debated the ‘international division of 
labour’ and ‘global commodity chains’ (Bair and Werner, 2011; Jenkins, 1984). 
Enabling this ‘major spatial-georpahical reorganisation’ to take shape was a series of 
technoscientific shifts in the transport industry. For example, standardisation, closely 
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linked to the introduction of the shipping container, as well as increased reliance on 
information technology, helped to speed up circulation and manage production and 
distribution along internationalized supply chains through different modes of transport 
(Levinson, 2008; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2009). Critical authors have discussed such 
technoscientific developments and management techniques at the core or the logistics 
revolution and traced its origins in the field of military logistics. An important 
consideration in the literature on the logistics revolution has been labour’s ability and 
its unique position to contest such logistics space by disrupting trade routes. Neilson 
explains, for example, ‘logistics workers have realized they hold a strategic position in 
global production systems’ (Neilson, 2012: 331). Although forms of contestation are 
also space specific and logistics chains tend to incorporate highly uneven modalities of 
labour.   
The palpable changes in the sinews of commodity trade have been reflected in academic 
debates about maritime ports specifically, with theorists urging a ‘re-think’ of the port 
(Olivier and Slack, 2006: 1409) in the context of global supply chain management 
(Robinson, 2002; Song and Panayides, 2008). Studies focused attention on the 
changing ‘geography of port terminal operators’ within integrated international 
networks (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012: 249), as increasing privatisation of typically 
state-operated infrastructure resulted in the expansion and consolidation of privately 
owned global terminal operators. One consequence of this has been the 
internationalisation of global network terminal operators (GNTs) (Notteboom and 
Rodrigue, 2012; Olivier and Slack, 2006; Slack and Frémont, 2005), with port 
operations divided among a handful of influential global corporations overseeing an 
integrated international network of terminals. Harvey, among others, has pointed to the 
production of such immense concentrations of corporate power in the transport sector 
(Harvey, 2011). Today, the top five GNTs are Hutchison Port Holdings, Cosco 
Shipping Ports, APM Terminals, PSA International and Dubai Ports World (DP 
World); in 2015, these five firms controlled a remarkable 49.2% of total world 
container throughput (DP World Limited, 2017: 11). Anderson has noted that such 
‘Global Network Terminal Operators have not only driven the privatisation of the port 
sector, but also led the development of the port sector in the world’s new trading zones, 
and often in countries where independent unions are either historically weak or 
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altogether illegal’ (Anderson, 2013: 129). This shifting terrain of GNTs has in turn had 
regionally specific implication in the GCC, accentuating competitive tendencies as 
discussed below.  
Aside from the overarching trends towards concentration and privatisation of maritime 
port assets, the specific technoscientific innovations associated with logistics have also 
given the industry a role in constructing economic space. For example, mega container 
ships, which have doubled in capacity in a decade, ushered the developments of mega-
container ports. This is especially significant in the context of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council because states are devoting massive lands, reclamation projects and resources 
to constructing such ports. Yet, another spatial reconfiguration has been, a Dubai 
innovation, the logistics city – a space dedicated in its totality to the circulation of 
commodities through warehousing, packaging, and the like (Cowen, 2014: chapter 5). 
The impact of such spaces on the economic geography of the GCC has been stark and 
largely under theorised.  
GCC logistics space 
 
The GCC has become a central node in the worldwide circulation of commodities. The 
reasons for the growth of the Gulf’s logistics infrastructure relate to its strategic 
geographic location along the Asia–Europe trade route, which has propelled massive 
levels of expenditure on mega transport infrastructure in various GCC states, including 
ports, airports, trains and roads. More than 60% of the total expenditure on ports in the 
Middle East is located in the GCC.2 Both new mega port construction and expansion 
of existing ports are taking place, with new, highly automated ports designed to 
accommodate the largest container ships in the world. These port projects are also 
integrally linked to the development of wider logistics networks, including passenger 
and freight railway schemes, airports, special economic zones, and so-called logistics 
cities. Even in relation to humanitarian assistance in the conflict-ridden wider Middle 
East region, Dubai’s International Humanitarian City has become the regional logistics 
centre, hosting nine United Nations agencies. 
 
Although there had been strong trade ties between the GCC, South Korea and Japan 
previously, China’s insertion into the global economy, in particular, prompted a 
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substantial increase in the export of oil, gas and petrochemical materials from the GCC 
region eastwards, and very significantly, in reverse, the import of a vast array of 
commodities from East Asia for internal GCC consumption and re-export to Europe 
and other areas. 3  The ensuring consolidation of domestic GCC conglomerates, 
especially in the construction and retail sectors, helped to cement the GCC as a 
significant import zone for commodities manufactured elsewhere (Hanieh, 2015). In 
addition to being central to commodity circulation from Asia to Europe, GCC maritime 
ports are also positioned as crucial feeder ports to smaller East African ports. According 
to the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 67% of total GCC exports are to Asia and only 
18% are to the West, while 40% of total imports are from Asia and 45% are from the 
West.  
 
Surprisingly, given these trends, maritime infrastructure has not featured centrally in 
analysis of the contemporary Gulf region. There has been a very rich discussion of 
urbanisation and liberalisation in the GCC, much of it focused on the city-state of Dubai, 
but these have typically been more concerned with the role of construction 
megaprojects and architectural forms, the spatiality of urban life (Acuto, 2010; 
Elsheshtawy, 2008, 2004), and the evolving corporatist models that underpin state-
capital relations in the Gulf (Buckley, 2013; Buckley and Hanieh, 2014; Kanna, 2011). 
More recently, scholars have turned to looking at the ways in which these features of 
the Gulf urban landscape are being generalised to other parts of the Middle East, putting 
forward categories such as the ‘Dubai model’ (Elsheshtawy, 2010; Hvidt, 2009) and 
the ‘megaproject phase of development’ (Rizzo, 2014) that find their genesis in the 
Gulf and then spread to other Arab countries (Pierre-Arnaud Barthel, 2010). 
Importantly, all of these features of the Gulf’s urbanisation process are closely related 
to the role of maritime infrastructure and associated logistical networks, yet these have 
been downplayed in the general literature on the region.  
Moreover, much of the critical literature on the Gulf tends to focus on individual states 
or cities; there is a relative neglect of the wider GCC project and its impact on national 
development. This is a major gap, as the changing global location of the GCC has 
occurred concomitantly with the deepening (albeit contradictory) integration of GCC 
member states (Ulrichsen, 2011). Formed in 1981, the initial impetus for the GCC was 
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increasing military tensions in the Gulf, specifically the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 
nearly decade-long war between Iraq and Iran. In this context, the United States – the 
main foreign power in the Gulf – fully backed the attempt to bring the six hydrocarbon-
rich monarchies within a single security umbrella that would be closely linked to the 
US military. Since those early days, however, the GCC has also developed into a closer 
political and economic alliance, with agreements (not always fulfilled) aimed at 
encouraging a single common market, a customs union, free movement of citizens 
between the different Gulf states, and standardised treatment around tax, pensions, 
social welfare and capital ownership (Hanieh, 2015: 104). Many commentators have 
drawn analogies with European integration, although the Gulf has progressed at a much 
slower and more hesitant pace than its larger neighbour. 
 
Significantly, however, GCC integration did not extinguish ‘tensions within and 
between different [Gulf] states’ (Hanieh, 2015: 105). While capital flows across the 
pan-GCC scale have increased dramatically over the past decade, leading tangentially 
towards what Hanieh describes as ‘Khaleeji Capital’, this has been a highly uneven and 
hierarchical process (Hanieh, 2015: 103). Most specifically, Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
have emerged as the core zones of this structure – with considerable levels of cross-
border investment flows, closer alignment on political questions, and numerous joint 
economic initiatives between these two states – while the other Gulf states have been 
integrated as junior partners in the process.  
 
Logistics infrastructure provides an important lens through which to analyze these 
tendencies. All Gulf states have heavily prioritized infrastructure development as part 
of wider diversification strategies aimed at reducing the region’s reliance on 
hydrocarbon exports. A key feature of these strategies (discussed in further detail below) 
is the building of a more robust regionally integrated logistics network, aimed at 
promoting cross-border trade. At the same time, as we shall see below, these plans and 
the projected port developments herald fierce competition over trade routes and 
international markets, which play out in considerable duplication, overcapacity, and 
heightened rivalries between Gulf states. 
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But despite the utility of logistics infrastructure as a frame for understanding these 
dynamics, there has been little scholarly attention paid towards the Gulf logistics sector. 
One partial exception to this lacuna is work on Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port, the world’s ninth-
largest container port by traffic. Ramos’s perceptive Dubai Amplified: The Engineering 
of a Port Geography (2010) placed Jebel Ali Port centrally in the city-state’s 
urbanisation process and development trajectory.4 Jebel Ali is important because its 
development model is the prototype that is being replicated across the GCC. One core 
feature of this model is an emphasis on intermodal transport and automation, with the 
movement of commodities seamlessly linked between free trade zones and different 
kinds of transport networks. Jebel Ali, for example, contains a free zone and Logistics 
City, which are connected to Dubai’s World Central complex and Al Maktoum Airport 
in one large customs-free area.5 This integration is aimed at speeding up the turn-over 
time of commodities through Dubai, the wider Gulf, and global markets, with the 
logistics sector acting as the underlying substratum for this circulation. As a Jebel Ali 
Free Zone marketing manager explained in a fieldwork interview: ‘We have created a 
streamlined process for our customers. They only interact with one person to set up 
their business and trade here. This is the quickest process in the region’.6 
 
Other states, including Oman and Qatar, are replicating this process by developing their 
regulations in a similar fashion and constructing ‘one-stop shops’ for investors. While 
some authors have commented on the internationalisation of the Dubai model in the 
production and management of logistics space (Cowen, 2014; Jacobs and Hall, 2007), 
the model’s regionalisation across the GCC has not been adequately explored. Studying 
this replication through the emergent GCC maritime port map helps to clarify the 
contradictory process of GCC integration. It suggests that the GCC integration project 
is a complicated and uneven one, whereby plans for both integration and diversification 
are based on the ability to accumulate across regional space, but within a framework of 
interregional competition and much duplication of development initiatives. We have 
here both integration and competition as contemporaneous tendencies; it is this 
hierarchical structure that is vital to keep in view while mapping the development in 
the region.  
 
The Gulf’s Logistics Space and the Rise of Oman and Qatar 
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A key theme of economic policy making in the GCC is the notion of diversification: an 
attempt to expand alternative industries beyond that of hydrocarbon production. Over 
the last few years these diversification strategies have been elaborated through a series 
of multi-year ‘vision’ documents, which outline the prioritisation and proposed 
investment for those sectors envisioned as holding potential for high growth. These 
vision documents are written in elaborate corporate-style language, typically drafted by 
foreign consultancy firms and advisors. 7  They form the centrepiece of economic 
planning in all GCC states.8  
 
Although there has been some debate about the likely success of such diversification 
plans (Hvidt, 2013), one of their striking features is the prominence of integrated trade 
infrastructure and the construction of logistics hubs. Echoing the emphasis placed on 
this trade infrastructure by international financial institutions,9  all Gulf states have 
earmarked enormous amounts of funding for the building of new ports, free trade zones, 
and other intermodal transport networks. The Saudi government, for example, has 
announced the establishment of four new economic cities, the largest of which will be 
the US$93bn King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC). KAEC will include the largest 
port in the Red Sea region and a logistics and industrial area.10 Similarly, the United 
Arab Emirates vision focuses on the country’s position as a ‘regional business hub’ 
(UAE Vision 2021, n.d.: n.p.). Likewise, Kuwait’s Vision 2035 aims to develop Kuwait 
as a financial and commercial hub; as part of this, Kuwait’s new Mubarak Port is 
designed to enhance its position into a regional trade hub.11 Echoing these trends, 
Bahrain’s Vision 2030 projects Bahrain as a regional manufacturing and logistics hub, 
built around several special investment zones, including Bahrain International 
Investment Park, Bahrain Investment Wharf and Bahrain Logistics Zone, which have 
been set up close to the Khalifa bin Salman Port at Hidd.12  
 
The strategic plans of Qatar and Oman also highlight this general orientation towards 
trade and logistics infrastructure development in the Gulf. Qatar holds about 14% of 
the world’s gas reserves—the third-largest on the global scale, following Russia and 
Iran. The transport of this gas has been crucial to the country’s economy and thus Ras 
Laffan, Qatar’s main liquefied natural gas export facility, has been expanded to become 
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the world’s largest. However, Qatar’s strategic planning extends well beyond a focus 
on gas, and the country’s National Vision 2030 has highlighted the construction of 
‘world-class infrastructure’ as a principal element of its future development (General 
Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008: n.p.). Much of this new building is a 
consequence of Qatar’s successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup, which has 
necessitated an upgrade of logistics infrastructure in order to cope with the import of 
basic construction materials. The key example of this is construction of the New Hamad 
Port, discussed further below. 
 
With smaller oil reserves than its neighbours, Oman has had a very advanced 
diversification agenda, aiming both to reduce reliance on oil and to deal with the issue 
of endemic youth unemployment by investing in newer sectors of the economy. Oman’s 
diversification efforts aim to steadily position it as a trade gateway into the wider region 
by adopting plans that from their inception take into account connections to multiple 
modes of transport. In the maritime port sector specifically, the Omani state aims to 
leverage the position of ports outside the Strait of Hormuz to establish itself as a 
regional logistics hub.13 The country has focused these efforts on three key container 
ports that are undergoing current construction or major expansion: Sohar, Salalah and 
Duqm.  
 
Ports in Oman and Qatar are all in advanced stages of construction.14 As noted above, 
however, these two states are at different moments of logistics expansion, with Oman 
ranking number three in GCC port capacity and Qatar only recently beginning its entry 
into this industry. A closer examination of these new and upgraded ports illustrates both 
the emulation of Dubai’s Jebel Ali model as well as the specificities of development in 
these two emerging maritime centres. Through this discussion we can see the trends 
towards regional integration intrinsic to the GCC project, but also the sharpening 
competition between different Gulf states. 
 
Sohar Port (Oman) 
 
Sohar Port and Freezone brands itself as the ‘cornerstone in the region's fast developing 
road-air-rail infrastructure’ (SOHAR Port and Freezone, 2017: n.p.). It is managed by 
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the Sohar Industrial Port Company, a fifty-fifty joint venture between the Port of 
Rotterdam and the Omani government, and falls within the Greater Sohar Industrial 
Zone. The specific container terminal within this larger project, the Oman International 
Container Terminal, is a joint venture between Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), the 
government of Oman, Steinweg (Netherlands) and a number of local private 
investors.15 Hutchison Port Holdings is a subsidiary of the multinational conglomerate 
CK Hutchison Holdings Limited (Hong Kong), a leading global port developer and 
operator. The project brings Sohar Port into HPH’s international network, spanning 26 
countries. The Sohar Freezone on the other hand is operated through a joint venture 
between the government of Oman, the Port of Rotterdam and India’s SKIL 
Infrastructure. Within the free zone 100% foreign ownership is permitted, and there is 
a 10-year tax exemption that is extendable depending on the rate of ‘Omanization’ the 
company undertakes. Sohar Port’s three major clusters are logistics, petrochemicals and 
metals. A major terminal to handle agricultural bulk cargo is also underway. The port 
replaced Mina Qaboos in Muscat, which will in turn be transformed into a tourist 
destination for cruise ships (tourism is another focus of Oman’s diversification efforts).  
 
The port is positioning itself clearly against the well-established Jebel Ali Port. During 
fieldwork in Dubai in February 2017, the author noted a large advertisement for Sohar 
Port just outside Jebel Ali reading, ‘Why go through the Strait when you can go straight 
to the Gulf?’ This statement captures the clear contrast and advantage that Sohar Port 
is attempting to sell to its customers. It also illustrates that despite the broader 
framework of GCC economic integration and cross-border investments, such 
megaprojects compete against each other for market share, aiming to attract foreign 
investment in newly constructed free trade zones and logistics parks.  
 
There has been substantial dredging work involved in deepening Sohar Port’s access 
channel, the turning basin, a navigation channel and the existing fishing port. Part of 
the dredged sand was used to reclaim land for the future container terminal. This 
confirms AlShehabi and Suroor’s argument that land reclamation is connected to a shift 
‘towards “privatisation” of the land, with the state largely playing the role of a land 
broker and facilitator’ (AlShehabi and Suroor, 2016: 839). In this instance there is 
privatization not only through concessionary agreements, but also through land 
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reclamation and the essential gifting of state land to international and domestic capital 
groups. To give but one example, an agreement between Muscat's Supreme Council of 
Planning, Sohar Freezone and Al Siraj Investment Holding saw a sizeable logistics 
services complex built at the Sohar Freezone. The aim was to create a logistics centre 
for the distribution of vehicles and spare parts. Those holding local agency rights for 
car products, such as Suhail Bahwan Automotive (handling Nissan and BMW) and 
Oman Trading Establishment (Hyundai), will be the main groups to benefit from this 
space (Times of Oman, 2012: n.p.). The Bahwan Group and Oman Trading 
Establishment are two longstanding and large Omani conglomerates controlled by well-
established merchant families. This arrangement thus illustrates the production of 
privatised logistics space for the benefit of domestic and international capital.  
 
Salalah Port (Oman) 
 
Salalah Port is made up of a container terminal with seven berths and a general cargo 
terminal, with infrastructure to handle the world's largest container vessels, as well as 
bunkering and warehousing. It operates mainly as a transhipment hub. Oman’s Ministry 
of Transport and Communications plans to expand Salalah Port further. The port is 
owned and managed by the Salalah Port Services Company, a joint venture between 
Danish APM Terminals (30%), the Oman Ministry of Finance (20%), HSBC Bank 
(14%) and a host of local private-sector investors, government pension funds, and 
investors on the Muscat Securities Market. In 1996, APM Terminals signed a 30-year 
concession agreement with the government of Oman to build and manage the port. 
APM Terminals has a geographical presence in 39 countries, including 65 port and 
terminal facilities and 200 inland services (UNCTAD, 2015: n.p.). Such concessions 
bring Oman’s Salalah Port into APM Terminals’ international network, also 
establishing APM Terminals’ sister company, Maersk Line, the world's largest 
container shipping company, as the main shipping line at the port. Aside from 
embedding Salalah in APM’s international network, the project seeks to break Jebel 
Ali’s monopoly as the main port of entry for leading international shipping companies. 
The importance of this has been illustrated in the recent dispute between Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia/UAE (discussed further below).  
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Duqm Port (Oman) 
 
The last of Oman’s ports, Duqm, is the centrepiece of the Duqm Special Economic 
Zone (DSEZ). It will cover an area of 1777 square km and 80 km of coastline along the 
Arabian Sea. DSEZ will be the largest free trade zone in the Middle East and North 
African region thus far, and among the largest in the world. Duqm is an interesting case 
of an ‘integrated economic development comprising a seaport, industrial area, fishing 
harbour, tourist zone, a logistics centre and an education and training zone’ (Port of 
Duqm, 2017: n.p.). Financing for the Duqm Port Project came from the Kuwait Fund 
for Arab and Economic Development, and the Japan Bank funded the Duqm Port and 
Dry Dock project. 
 
The Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority (SEZAD), established by royal decree in 
October 2011, is the main regulatory and supervisory body for the DSEZ and is 
responsible for managing and developing all economic activities, including 
construction of the port. However, direct management is by the Port of Duqm 
Company, a joint equal venture between the Consortium Antwerp Port Company and 
the Omani government on a 28-year concession. SEZAD will be the focal point for 
potential investors and will have a one-stop shop to help new investors. This is a similar 
model to the Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone. As with other special economic zones in the 
GCC, SEZAD will entice private investment by allowing 100% freehold for 
international corporations, tax exemption for up to 30 years renewable for a similar 
period and minimal labour regulations.  
 
New Hamad Port (Qatar) 
 
The New Hamad Port project is among the largest of Qatar’s infrastructure 
developments. Located to the south of the capital, Doha, Qatar’s new port, estimated at 
a cost of US$7.4bn, was inaugurated on 9 February 2015 (a year ahead of schedule) 
with the flooding of its main basin. The project, when completed, will cover 26.5 square 
km and will consist of the port itself, a new naval base for the Qatar Emiri Naval Forces 
and the Qatar Economic Zone 3, which will host a series of logistics parks. The 
completion date for the project has been brought forward from 2030 to 2020.  
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In line with its investment in transport and logistics infrastructure, Qatar is also at 
various stages of constructing several specialized economic zones: Ras Bufontas (near 
the airport), Um Alhoul (in conjunction with the New Hamad Port) and the Al Karaana 
(by the Saudi border, and on hold at the moment). Each of these zones is strategically 
connected to the New Hamad Port and three planned logistics parks that will be located 
inside the port itself (Al Wakra, Birkat Al Awamir and Aba Salil).16 These logistics 
parks aim to seamlessly link the production efforts in the economic zones to 
transhipment from the port itself. Although Qatar’s economic zones are significantly 
less developed than those of the UAE, the Ministry of Economy and Commerce is 
planning to emulate the UAE model through the establishment of one-stop-shop 
registration for domestic and international companies.   
 
Emulation, Integration, and Competitive Hierarchies 
 
Emerging from this account of port construction in Oman and Qatar is the clear attempt 
by governments in these two countries to replicate the logistics model pursued by DP 
World and attempt to capture some of the container traffic handled by Dubai’s Jebel 
Ali Port. The goal is to build very large-scale port infrastructure, which would allow 
Omani and Qatari ports to accommodate the ever-increasing growth in container ship 
size and cargo throughput. The orientation is towards connecting with international 
markets, and establishing their respective ports as important nodal connections to global 
trade flows. The development of these ports is thus conceived not simply for supplying 
the needs of domestic markets, but rather as an attempt to achieve a foothold within 
wider regional and global flows.  
 
Key to this is the notion of intermodalism. As with Jebel Ali, both Oman and Qatar 
seek to build an integrated logistics space that connects maritime ports, airports, rail 
and road. An important linking feature of these connected corridors is the creation of 
free zones that can assemble, label, and repackage commodities due for re-export, 
thereby embedding these countries firmly in international supply chains through value-
added logistics activities. This hard infrastructure is augmented by a soft infrastructure 
that seeks to incentivise international firms to relocate their activities to the new 
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logistics spaces. Provision of 100% foreign ownership, zero corporate tax and 
import/export duties, and no restriction on capital repatriation are principal elements of 
this incentivisation.  
 
This regional emulation of Dubai’s model needs to be situated, however, in the context 
of GCC regional integration. The vision documents noted above highlight the goal of 
advancing intra-regional trade and integrating Gulf infrastructure within a single pan-
GCC network. The strategic planning for Oman’s ports, for example, emphasizes how 
they will be linked to the pan-GCC railway system that is currently being constructed 
across the Gulf; the goal is to move (at an ever-increasing pace) commodities from and 
through Oman to other states in the GCC. Along with building and connecting the 
physical infrastructure, work on harmonizing border policies to facilitate cross-border 
flows is also on-going.  
 
In this context, Figure 1 maps the location of all Gulf ports and their planned capacity 
increases from 2015 to 2020. If planned port construction and capacity expansion 
continue at current rates across the GCC, total port capacity is due to increase from 25 
million TEU (20-foot-equivalent units) in 2010 to 60 million TEU by 2020 (Roscoe, 
2012). The map demonstrates the striking increase in port competition heralded by the 
projected capacity increases in Qatar and Oman. In 2015, the four UAE ports (Jebel 
Ali, Khalifa, Khorfakkan and Fujairah) constituted 31.2 million TEU, while ports in 
Qatar (New Hamad Port) and Oman (Sohar, Duqm and Salalah) made up 8.5 million 
TEU of the total GCC port capacity. By 2020 – in only five years’ time – Oman and 
Qatar’s combined port capacity will have grown to 22 million TEU, a more than 250% 
increase, exceeding that of the regional behemoth, Jebel Ali. 
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Figure 1. Container ports in the GCC – current and future capacity. Map by author, 
based on industry reporting in Middle East Economic Digest Projects. 
 
We thus have here a process of increased competition – structured by the Gulf’s 
insertion into global commodity chains – alongside the professed goals of tighter 
regional integration and harmonisation. This raises the very real scenario of port 
overcapacity in the Gulf over coming years, particularly if projections of a slowdown 
in global trade volumes prove correct. Growth in global container port demand is 
predicted to slow to less than 3% per annum due to the sharp decline in China’s export 
growth (Drewry, 2016: n.p.).  
 
This likely scenario of heightened intra-GCC competition and overcapacity needs to be 
overlaid by the trends in the concentration of global port operation noted earlier. One 
way this plays out in the GCC is the modalities of port infrastructure financing. As the 
narrative above illustrates, Oman, with its more limited oil reserves, is relying heavily 
on concessionary agreements through joint ventures with (mostly) European port 
operators. Oman is unique in this respect, rolling out public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
that facilitate privatisation through concession/lease agreements or Build Operate and 
Transfer (BOT) arrangements between the government and private terminal 
operators.17 Such PPPs, including with the Port of Rotterdam (in the case of Sohar), 
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Antwerp Consortium (Duqm), Hutchinson Holdings (Sohar Container Port), and APM 
Terminals (Salalah), increasingly join Oman’s ports with the wider networks of market-
dominant port operators. Moreover, through these joint ventures, international port 
operators are entering the GCC maritime market. However, this process is also 
accentuating the competition between UAE-based operators (such as DP World and 
Gulftainer) and other international companies. The tendency towards increased 
competition between global port operators is thus refracted through the GCC regional 
integration project. The pan-GCC scale acts to mediate and heighten the competition 
between global port operators and local, Gulf-based firms. 
 
An important consideration in assessing these future scenarios is the possible impact of 
a prolonged period of low oil prices. Much of the funding for port infrastructure in the 
GCC over the past decade took place during a time of rising oil prices, but since mid-
2014 the oil price has fallen by more than half, fluctuating around US$50 per barrel 
during the first half of 2017. One of the critical consequences of the resulting drop in 
oil revenues is a move by Gulf states, other than Oman, to establish regulatory 
frameworks for the use of PPPs in infrastructure financing. Kuwait revamped its PPP 
laws in 2014, new PPP laws were introduced in Dubai in November 2015, and Qatar is 
in the process of drafting a PPP framework. This is an important emerging trend, as 
thus far these GCC states have avoided utilising PPPs for infrastructure projects, opting 
for their management through state-owned conglomerates and drawing upon oil 
revenues for funding. A likely outcome of these new financing arrangements is a further 
deepening of international competition in the GCC logistics sector, as the major 
international port operators vie to gain access to this important node of global trade. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has foregrounded logistics as a lens to understand the nature of intra-GCC 
relations. The drive towards intermodal transport infrastructure, conceived to speed 
circulation of commodities through all segments of the logistics chain, is central to GCC 
development plans and continues to impact the regional landscape through immense 
dredging and land reclamation projects, as well as the use of large tracts of land for 
industrial port zones, free trade zones and logistics cities. In a region central to global 
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trade (especially in oil and gas) and thus imperial interests, this emerging Gulf transport 
infrastructure reveals much about the nature of development in the Gulf, and the ways 
in which different Gulf states are positioned within the wider GCC project. A focus on 
the ports and logistics spaces in Qatar and Oman underlines the differential 
incorporation of GCC states in internationalised logistics chains. Although very much 
framed by GCC regional integration, the large-scale, intermodal logistics 
infrastructures planned by Oman and Qatar present a challenge to the UAE’s supremacy 
in the Gulf’s maritime industry. This duplication presents the very real possibility of 
overcapacity in this sector – particularly if there is a further downturn in the global 
economy. As this article was being written, the saliency of these trends was powerfully 
illustrated by the crisis that emerged between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on one side, 
and Qatar, on the other, making rivalries more apparent. The divergent financing 
models of port development, specifically Oman’s use of PPPs and joint ventures with 
global operators, are accentuating these competitive tensions between GCC states. This 
is particularly important for the future global position of Dubai’s DP World, which 
depends so critically on Jebel Ali Port as its ‘stronghold’.  
 
The effective embargo by Saudi Arabia and the UAE confirms the main lines of intra-
GCC rivalry noted throughout this paper; it also shows just how critical the logistics 
and maritime infrastructure sector is to understanding these rivalries and the spatial 
geopolitics of the region. We see here the ways in which the trends discussed 
throughout this article are vital to understanding the emerging contours of GCC 
relations, in terms of both competitive rivalries and mutual interests. Precisely because 
Salalah had been embedded in APM’s international network through the processes 
described above, it has (at least partially) broken Jebel Ali’s monopoly as the main port 
of entry for the Gulf. As the planned port construction unfolds over the next five years, 
these features of the Gulf’s logistics space will be become ever more central to 
understanding the politics of the region.  
 
 
  
1 The World Bank has recently noted, for example, that “logistics performance both in 
international trade and domestically is central to the economic growth and competitiveness of 
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countries, and the logistics sector is now recognized as one of the core pillars of economic 
development” (Arvis et al., 2016: 1).  
2 Figure calculated by author using data from MEED. See http://www.meed.com/meed-
projects/. 
3 With global production heavily reliant on oil and 17 million barrels going through the Strait 
of Hormuz daily, maritime trade is vital to the GCC states. Historically, this has heightened 
the militarisation of the region; as noted by Jones, ‘over the course of the twentieth century, 
preserving the security not just of Saudi Arabia but of the entire Persian Gulf region and the 
flow of Middle Eastern oil were among the United States’ chief political-economic concerns’ 
(Jones, 2012: 208 ). In this manner, the history of oil and gas production in the region is 
closely tied to the development of the infrastructure necessary to transport it and, equally, to 
the forms of militarisation that underpinned it. 
4 While the GCC’s recent port infrastructure is less examined, there is rich historical writing 
on GCC port cities and transnational connections (see, among others, Al-Rasheed, 2004; 
Fuccaro, 2009).  
5 There are up to 100 free or special economic zones across the six GCC states. Of these, the 
UAE has 40. It also has the most liberalised regulations on free zones of all the six GCC 
states. 
6 Visit to Jebel Ali Port and interview, 15 March 2015.  
7 According to Al-Kuwārī, these vision documents ‘have been elaborated without national 
consultation’ and ‘warmly received and supported by the official and foreign media in an 
astonishing manner that puzzles both Arab citizens and observers’ (Al-Kuwārī, 2012: 87). 
8 The various vision documents are available through state ministries: Bahrain (issuu, 2013); 
Oman (Sultanate of Oman, 2017); Qatar (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, 
2017); Saudi Arabia (2017); UAE (UAE, n.d.); and Kuwait (General Secretariat of the 
Supreme Council for Planning and Development, n.d.).  
9 The World Bank notes that ‘efficiency of existing trade corridors connecting MENA 
[Middle East and North Africa] countries with major global markets’ is necessary and that 
hub ports are ‘vital to trading competitively across borders’ (Rouis and Tabor, 2013: 41). In 
relation to the GCC, the World Bank states that ‘intraregional trade among GCC countries 
could benefit from further enhancements in regional infrastructure and reduced border 
controls’ (2010: 8). 
10 KAEC is being developed and managed by private companies and is listed on the Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul). The project has suffered many setbacks, including a four-time 
change to the original planned timeline and funding issues with the drop in oil prices (see 
Allam, 2010). 
11 Mubarak Al Kabeer would complement the country’s three existing ports: Shuwaikh, 
Shuaiba and Doha. The location of this particular port caused a dispute between Iraq and 
Kuwait, with protests that the new port was blocking Iraq’s maritime lane through to Basra 
and impairing the planned deepwater Grand Faw port in Basra. The Iraqi state eventually put 
forward plans for a different location further east to avoid problems. 
12 Funding for Bahrain’s infrastructure projects has come from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, 
with the airport expansion being funded by Abu Dhabi. GCC funds are also being used to 
support Bahrain’s railway projects. This funding is critical in terms of political alliances, 
bringing Bahrain closer to the Saudi and UAE regimes.   
13 The country has been developing a Sultanate of Oman Logistics Strategy 2040 blueprint to 
elevate Oman among the top 10 logistics hubs in the region (HSBC Global Connections, 
2015) 
14  Information on the ports in the following discussion is drawn from fieldwork and 
interviews with industry experts and company information.  
15 The general cargo terminal will be operated through a joint venture with C. Steinweg, and a 
joint venture between Oiltanking and Odfjell for the liquid cargo terminal.  
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16 Manateq (formerly the Economic Zones Company), a state-owned but independently run 
company, was established in 2011 by a decree by the minister of business and trade to 
oversee the development of these parks. 
17 There is a substantial critical body of literature on PPPs and the claims that they improve 
efficiency and expertise in delivering infrastructure services (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 
2017; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Koppenjan and Enserink, 2009; Siemiatycki, 2013). 
 
 
Bibliography  
 
Acuto, M (2010) High-rise Dubai urban entrepreneurialism and the technology of 
symbolic power. Cities 27(4): 272–284.  
Akhavan, M (2017) Development dynamics of port-cities interface in the Arab Middle 
Eastern world - The case of Dubai global hub port-city. Cities 60(Part A): 343–
352.  
Al-Kuwārī, ʿAlī Khalīfa (2012) The visions and strategies of the GCC countries from the 
perspective of reforms: the case of Qatar. Contemporary Arab Affairs 5: 86–106.  
Allam, A (2010) Saudi Arabia’s desert dream remains a work in progress. Financial 
Times. 
Allen, WB (1997) The Logistics Revolution and Transportation. The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 553: 106–116.  
Al-Rasheed, M (2004) Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf. London & New York: 
Routledge. 
AlShehabi, OH and Suroor, S (2016) Unpacking “accumulation By dispossession”, 
“fictitious commodification”, and “fictitious capital formation”: tracing the 
dynamics of Bahrain’s land reclamation. Antipode 48(4): 835–856.  
Anderson, J (2013) Intersecting arcs of mobilisation: The transnational trajectories of 
Egyptian dockers’ unions. European Urban and Regional Studies 20: 128–133.  
Arvis, J-F, Saslavsky, D, Ojala, L, Shepherd, B, Busch, C, Raj, A and Naula T (2016) Trade 
Logistics in the Global Economy: The Logistics Performance Index and its 
Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Bayliss, K and Van Waeyenberge, E (2017) Unpacking the public private partnership 
revival. The Journal of Development Studies: 1–17.  
Bonacich, E, Wilson, JB (2008) Getting the Goods: Ports, Labor, and the Logistics 
Revolution. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 
Buckley, M (2013) Locating neoliberalism in Dubai: migrant workers and class struggle 
in the autocratic city. Antipode 45: 256–274.  
Buckley, M and Hanieh, A (2014) Diversification by urbanization: tracing the property-
finance nexus in Dubai and the Gulf: urbanization and the property-finance 
nexus in the Gulf. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38: 155–
175.  
Cowen, D (2014) The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
DP World Limited (2017) Investor presentation, August 2017. Available at: 
http://web.dpworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/DP-World_Investor-
Presentation_August-2017.pdf (accessed 22 September 2017). 
Drewry (2016) Container ports industry entering new phase as M&A deals change the 
landscape. August 1. Available at: 
https://www.drewry.co.uk/news/news/container-ports-industry-entering-
new-phase-as-ma-deals-change-the-landscape (accessed 25 June 2017). 
Ducruet, C and  Zaidi, F (2012) Maritime constellations: a complex network approach to 
shipping and ports. Maritime Policy & Management 39: 151–168.  
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Sage in Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space: http://journals.sagepub.com/loi/epda  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24738/  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Elsheshtawy, Y (2010) Little space, big space: everyday urbanism in Dubai. The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 17: 53–71. 
Elsheshtawy, Y (2008) Transitory sites: mapping Dubai’s “forgotten” urban spaces. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32: 968–988.  
Elsheshtawy, Y (2004) Planning middle eastern cities: an urban kaleidoscope. London & 
New York: Routledge. 
Fuccaro, N (2009) Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama Since 1800. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
General Secretariat for Development Planning (Qatar) (2008) Qatar National Vision 
2030. Forward. Available at: 
http://www.qdb.qa/English/Documents/QNV2030_English.pdf. (accessed 25 
June 2017).  
General Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development (Kuwait) 
(n.d.) NewKuwait. Available at: http://www.newkuwait.gov.kw/en/ (accessed 
22 September 2017). 
Graham, S and Marvin, S (2001) Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, 
Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition. London: Psychology Press. 
Hanieh, A (2015) Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Harvey, D (2011) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, D (2006) The Limits to Capital. London; New York: Verso. 
HSBC Global Connections (2015) Oman pushes ahead with logistics goal. United Arab 
Emirates edition, May 14. Available at: 
http://www.globalconnections.hsbc.com/uae/en/articles/oman-pushes-ahead-
logistics-goal (accessed March 2016).  
Hvidt, M (2013) Economic diversification in GCC countries: past record and future 
trends. Research Paper No. 27: Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance 
and Globalisation in the Gulf States. London: The London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55252/ 
(accessed 22 July 2016). 
Hvidt, M (2009) The Dubai model: an outline of key development-process elements in 
Dubai. International Journal of Middle East Studies 41: 397–418.  
issuu (2013) Bahrain Vision 2030. November 24. Available at: 
  https://issuu.com/economicdevelopmentboard/docs/bahrain_vision_2030 
(accessed 22 September 2017).  
Jacobs, W and Hall, PV (2007) What conditions supply chain strategies of ports? The 
case of Dubai. GeoJournal 68: 327–342.  
Jones, TC (2012) America, oil, and war in the Middle East. Journal of American History 
99: 208–218. doi:10.1093/jahist/jas045. 
Kanna, A (2011) Dubai, the City as Corporation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Koppenjan, JFM and Enserink, B (2009) Public–private partnerships in urban 
infrastructures: reconciling private sector participation and sustainability. Public 
Administration Review 69: 284–296.  
Levinson, M (2008) The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
McFarlane, C and Rutherford, J (2008) Political infrastructures: governing and 
experiencing the fabric of the city. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 32: 363–374.  
McNally, D (2011) Slump, austerity and resistance. Socialist Register 48: 36–63 
MEED (n.d.) MEED data tracking services.  
Available at: http://www.meed.com/meed-projects/ (accessed 21 July 2016). 
Mezzadra, S and Neilson, B (2015) Operations of capital. South Atlantic Quarterly 114: 1–
9.  
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Sage in Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space: http://journals.sagepub.com/loi/epda  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24738/  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar) (2017) Qatar National Vision 
2030. Available at: http://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/qnv1/Pages/default.aspx 
(accessed 22 September 2017).  
Notteboom, T (2011) Current issues in shipping, ports and logistics. Upa: ASP - Academic 
& Scientific Publishers. 
Notteboom, T and Rodrigue, JP (2012) The corporate geography of global container 
terminal operators. Maritime Policy & Management 39: 249–279. 
Notteboom, T and Rodrigue, JP (2009) The future of containerization: perspectives from 
maritime and inland freight distribution. GeoJournal 74: 7–22.  
Olivier, D and Slack, B (2006) Rethinking the port. Environ Plan A 38: 1409–1427.  
Pierre-Arnaud B (2010) Arab mega-projects: between the Dubai effect, global crisis, 
social mobilization and a sustainable shift. Built Environment 36: 133–145. 
Port of Duqm (2017) About: Port of Duqm. Available at: 
https://www.portduqm.com/About/Port-of-Duqm.html (accessed 22 
September 2017). 
Ramos, SJ (2010) Dubai amplified: the engineering of a port geography. Design and the 
built environment series. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Reuters (2017) Maersk line to begin Qatar feeder container shipments from Oman. June 
9. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-shipping/maersk-
line-to-begin-qatar-feeder-container-shipments-from-oman-idUSC7N1FK00Q 
(accessed 24 September 2017). 
Rizzo, A (2014) Rapid urban development and national master planning in Arab Gulf 
countries. Qatar as a case study. Cities 39: 50–57.  
Robinson, R (2002) Ports as elements in value-driven chain systems: the new paradigm. 
Maritime Policy & Management 29: 241–255.  
Roscoe, A (2012) DP world warns shipping industry about overcapacity. MEED: Middle 
East Economic Digest 56: 16–16. 
Rouis, M and Tabor, SR (2013) Regional economic integration in the Middle East and 
North Africa: beyond trade reform, directions in development., Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Saudi Arabia (2017) Vision 2030: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Available at: 
http://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en  (accessed 22 September 2017). 
Sekula, A and Burch, N (2011) The forgotten space. NLR, II: 78–79. 
Siemiatycki, M (2013) The global production of transportation public–private 
partnerships. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37: 1254–
1272.  
Slack, B and FréMont, A (2005) Transformation of port terminal operations: from the 
local to the global. Transport Reviews 25: 117–130.  
SOHAR Port and Freezone (2017) About: overview. Available at: 
http://www.soharportandfreezone.com/en/about/overview (accessed 22 
September 2017). 
Song, DW and Panayides, PM (2008) Global supply chain and port/terminal: integration 
and competitiveness. Maritime Policy & Management 35: 73–87.  
Sultanate of Oman (2017) Vision 2020. Supreme Council for Planning. Available at: 
http://www.scp.gov.om/en/Page.aspx?I=14 (accessed 22 September 2017).  
Times of Oman (2012) Freezone Sohar signs accord with Al Siraj for logistics park. 
November 25. Available at: 
http://timesofoman.com/article/3185/Business/Freezone-Sohar-signs-accord-
with-Al-Siraj-for-logistics-park (accessed 25 July 2016). 
Waldheim, C and Berger, A (2008) Logistics landscape. Landscape Journal 27: 219–246.  
World Bank (2010) Economic Integration in the GCC. World Bank: Middle East And 
North Africa Region. Available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/621311468276383272/pdf/575
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Sage in Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space: http://journals.sagepub.com/loi/epda  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24738/  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
170WP0Box353768B01PUBLIC10GCCStudyweb.pdf (accessed 22 September 
2017). 
UAE Vision 2021 (n.d.) UAE vision. Available at: https://www.vision2021.ae/en/our-
vision (accessed 20 September 2017). 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) (n.d.) Vision 2021. Available at: 
http://www.vision2021.ae/en (accessed 22 September 2017). 
Ulrichsen, KC (2011) Repositioning the GCC states in the changing global order. Journal 
of Arabian Studies 1: 231–247.  
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2015) Review of 
maritime transport 2015. Available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1374 
(accessed 21 July 2016). 
